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CASH RENTAL OF LAND AFTER DEATH TO FAMILY
CORPORATION: NO SPECIAL USE VALUATION RECAPTURE
— by Neil E. Harl*
 The rule has been well settled since publication of the
"qualified use" regulations in 19801 that land must meet a
pre-death qualified use test2 to be eligible for special use
valuation.  A similar requirement was imposed in the
recapture period after death to avoid recapture of the special
use valuation benefits.3 A recent case has addressed an
important issue in application of the post-death test;4 the
case could also be important in pre-death eligibility as well.
Pre-death test
The qualified use test requires, in the pre-death period,
that the decedent-to-be or member of that person's family
have an equity interest in the farm operation.5 That
interpretation, permitting the test to be met by a member of
the family of the decedent-to-be, was made in 19816 but
made retroactive  by statute to January 1, 1977.7 The cases
since that time have confirmed that a cash rent lease does
not provide an equity interest to the lessor;8 therefore, a
cash rent least to someone who is not a member of the
family9 of the decedent-to-be has been fatal to special use
valuation.10 Cash rent leases to tenants who are members of
the family meet the qualified use test.11
After-death test
The after-death test was not modified by the 1981
amendment12 and requires that each qualified heir meet the
qualified use test.13 Thus, each qualified heir must have an
equity interest in the farm operation. Even a cash rent lease
to a son has triggered the recapture tax.14 The only
exception, added in 1988 but retroactive to 1977, permits a
surviving spouse who inherits qualified real property to
lease the land on a "net cash basis" to a member of the
spouse's family without causing recapture.15
To sum up, the major difference between the pre-death
and post-death qualified use tests is that cash rent leases are
permitted in the pre death period if to a member of the
family as tenant; cash rent leases are not permitted in the
post-death period except for the exception noted above16
and the two-year grace period immediately after death when
the qualified use test need not be met.17
_____________________________________________________
*
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The Minter case
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has now decided a
case, Minter v. United States,18 involving a cash rental of
land in the post death period to a family corporation. The
facts of the case were that a family trust cash rented the land
to the family corporation. The three children (two daughters
and a son) were equal beneficial owners of the farmland in
the trust but the daughters each held only about six percent
of the corporation's stock. The IRS assessed a recapture tax
against the two daughters on the grounds they had failed to
meet the post death test.19 The district court, in an
unpublished opinion, granted summary judgment in favor of
IRS on the grounds that the post-death qualified use test
was not met. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the
daughters could retain the benefits of special use valuation.
Aside from the fact that the Eighth Circuit seemed not to
understand the difference between the pre-death and post-
death tests, and made much of the fact that an identical
leasing arrangement had passed muster with IRS at the
mother's death earlier for purposes of special use valuation
eligibility, the appellate court decision is questionable on
the grounds that the holders of the two-thirds interest in the
land bore only about 12 percent of the risk. Neither the
statute nor the regulations discuss the effect of a cash rent
lease to a family entity in which the qualified heirs own an
interest. However, a reasonable interpretation of the statute
requiring each qualified heir to meet the equity interest test
would be that each qualified heir own an interest in the
entity proportionate to the qualified heir's ownership interest
in the land. It seems reasonable to assume that a modest
departure from that rule would not be fatal, but for the
holder of a one-third interest in land to be able to meet the
test by owning less than six percent of the lessee seems well
outside reasonable bounds.
In conclusion
Until this matter is resolved by statute, regulations or
further litigation, it would seem prudent in all circuits,
including the Eighth, to assure that each qualified heir be
fully at risk where the land is cash rented to a family entity.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS.  Prior to filing
bankruptcy, the debtors fraudulently transferred their farm
homestead to third parties.  One of the debtors' creditors
filed suit in state court and received a judgment of
fraudulent transfer which was filed prior to the debtors'
bankruptcy filing.  In the bankruptcy case, the trustee also
moved for avoidance of the transfer as fraudulent.  The
trustee objected to the creditor's judgment lien claim against
the homestead, arguing that the judgment lien did not attach
to the property because the debtors did not have ownership
and possession of the property when the lien was recorded.
The court held that, under state law, the judgment attached
to the property when filed and remained a senior interest
against the property after the bankruptcy filing and during
the trustee's avoidance of the transfer.  In re Mathiason, 16
F.3d 234 (8th Cir. 1994), aff’g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff’g,
129 B.R. 173 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor had granted a creditor
a nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interest in
personal property which the debtor claimed as exempt
under state law in the Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. The
debtor sought to avoid the lien as impairing the exemption.
The creditor argued that under the state exemption laws, the
exemption did not apply to nonpossessory, nonpurchase
money liens; therefore, the lien did not impair the
exemption. The court held that Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305
(1991) overruled the Fifth Circuit’s prior case precedent;
therefore, the lien was avoidable as impairing the
exemption. Matter of Maddox, 15 F.3d 1347 (5th Cir.
1994).
TOOLS OF THE TRADE. The debtor operated a farm
fertilizer business in which the debtor removed cattle
manure from feedlots and sold the manure as fertilizer to
other farmers. The debtor owned a front-end loader, a truck,
radios used for communicating between the loader and
truck, an interest in a radio tower on which the radio
antennas were affixed, and a trailer for the loader. The
debtor claimed the equipment as exempt tools of the trade.
The court rejected the trustee’s argument that the equipment
be adapted exclusively for the debtor’s trade or business and
ruled that the equipment was eligible for the tools of the
trade exemption. In re Legg, 164 B.R. 69 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
NOTICE TO CREDITORS.  The FmHA filed a proof
of claim in the debtor's Chapter 12 case and requested that
notices be sent to the state office.  The debtors sent notice of
their proposed plan and confirmation hearing to the state
office of the United States Attorney and the FmHA national
office. The FmHA did not appear at the confirmation
hearing and argued that sufficient notice was not sent.  The
court held that the notice was not sufficient and  ordered a
new confirmation hearing. In re Miller, 16 F.3d 240 (8th
Cir. 1994), aff’g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff’g, 140 B.R. 499
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ALLOCATION OF PLAN PAYMENTS OF TAXES.
The debtor was a corporation which filed for Chapter 11 but
the debtor was liquidated under the plan. The IRS had an
administrative claim for post-petition taxes. Because of
other litigation, only one-half of the IRS claim was
promptly paid, with a portion of the litigation proceeds paid
after all appeals were exhausted. However, the IRS claim
continued to accrue penalties and interest during the appeals
such that the proceeds of the litigation were insufficient to
pay the total administrative claim. The IRS applied the
proceeds first to penalties and then to principal and interest
and sought payment of the deficiency from the debtor’s
principals. The principals sought an order requiring the
proceeds to be allocated first to principal and interest
because the principals had contributed their personal assets
and services without compensation to increase the
bankruptcy estate from the liquidation of the debtor.
